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Part 1: Why is justice relevant?
Identification of dimensions of relevance
It is possible to identify three interrelated dimensions in 
which a concern for justice was and continues to be relevant. 
First, there is the moral dimension. The conclusion of  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007, 
p.9) that there is at least a 90% probability that most of  the 
observed increases in globally averaged temperatures since 
the mid-20th century are due to anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) concentrations only tells half  the story of  climate 
change. The other ‘inconvenient truth’ revealed (IPCC, 2007, 
p.12) is that, in many cases, the most substantial effects of  
climate change will be felt by millions of  people from countries 
across Africa, Asia and the Pacific, whose historical path of  
development has not contributed significantly to this build-up 
of  GHGs and whose citizens’ standard of  living and lifestyles 
do not cause substantial carbon emissions. The issues raised 
by climate change are thus pregnant with moral concern.
Second, there is the legal dimension. The 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
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Introduction
This article1 considers how justice relates to and informs the structure of  international 
climate change mitigation2 architectures under which burdens are assumed by individual 
states. The argument can be made that the structure of  the current global architecture has, to 
a substantial extent, been determined in the domain of  realpolitik, not justice. In the domain 
of  realpolitik, states seek to maximise their national self-interest based on practical rather than 
ethical considerations. The more powerful the state, the more able it is to stay outside global 
regulatory systems if  its perception of  its national self-interest deems this appropriate. But if  
this is so, are considerations of  justice relevant to the shape of  future global climate change 
mitigation regimes? This article argues that they are.
Some account of  justice must, therefore, be given. This 
will be addressed in part 1. Part 2 will then consider the 
role principles of  distributive justice have played in the 
development of  the current global architecture. In so doing, 
it will identify an analytical matrix comprised of  the twin 
concepts of  a negotiated hierarchy of  differentiation and an obligation 
gap as a tool for deconstructing climate change mitigation 
architectures. Using this matrix, part 3 examines how some 
important models for the global post-2012 architecture build 
upon or depart from the current model. 
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is an international treaty. Under article 3(1) of  the UNFCCC, 
equity is identified as a core principle to guide parties in the 
discharge of  their binding commitments under article 4. Central 
to the UNFCCC is the issue of  ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR). While the 
principle of  CBDR does not, of  itself, impose any legally-binding 
obligation, it has sufficient legal weight to form the foundation for 
future legal instruments that deal with this problem (Rajamani, 
2000, p.124). Rajamani (p.130) aptly describes the CBDR 
principle as ‘the ethical anchor’ of  the developmental process 
behind the current global climate change architecture. If  this 
principle forms the ethical anchor, then justice forms the ethical 
material from which the anchor is constructed. 
Viewed thus, the role of  justice is to constitute 
the boundaries of  the CBDR principle in this 
developmental process.
Third, there is the political dimension.3 
Concern with justice enhances the 
possibility of  wide participation by states, 
particularly from ‘the global south’, in the 
arrangements made under any future architecture (Grasso, 
2007, pp.224-5; Najam, 2005, p.305; Rajamani, 2000, 
p.123; Ringus et al., 2002, p.1; Shukla, 1999, p.7). Without 
broad agreement by states that any future global architecture 
is just and fair, there is likely to be a legitimacy deficit in both 
the domestic and international arenas that will prove fatal 
to attempts to build an effective and truly global framework 
(Pew Centre, 2005, p.11). 
Justice, then, is highly relevant. The effectiveness of  
any post-2012 climate change mitigation architecture 
will, to a significant degree, be determined by the extent 
to which concerns with justice across these dimensions 
restrain the influence of  realpolitik. Moreover, the ability of  
justice to restrain realpolitik will depend on how alternative 
visions of  justice are reconciled in the development of  this 
architecture.
Justice of what?
While acknowledging that the unequal distribution of  power 
that drives concerns with procedural justice is relevant to the 
ongoing negotiations regarding a post-2012 policy framework 
(see Grasso, 2007, p.228; Shue, 1999, p.531), I will focus here 
on the more substantive considerations of  distributive justice. 
What follows is a necessarily brief  overview.
Distributive justice
Conceptually, distributive justice is ordinarily concerned 
with legitimating the distribution of  benefits (usually wealth 
and income) and burdens within and by political authorities 
(Feinberg, 1973, p.107).4 Distributive justice relates to the 
incidence of  costs and benefits among a group of  individuals 
and is commonly described by the maxim ‘to each his or 
her due’. This begs the question as to how the dues of  any 
particular individual are to be calculated. 
Here, the concept of  justice bifurcates into ‘formal’ and 
‘material’ principles. The formal principles of  justice are 
twofold. First, where persons are equal in all relevant respects, 
their dues are the same and they should be treated in the 
same way. Second, where a person’s dues depend upon some 
quantifiable attribute, the amount of  benefit to be enjoyed, 
or burden suffered, should be proportionate to the quantity 
of  the relevant attribute they possess. Material principles of  
justice relate to answering the question of  how each person’s 
dues are to be assessed (Feinberg, 1973, p.100; Miller, 1976, 
21).5 
Two commonly acknowledged material principles of  
justice are particularly important in this context, namely: 
• to each according to his/her deserts; and
• to each according to his/her needs.
Desert and justice
Desert-based principles of  distributive justice denote ‘a 
relationship between an individual and his conduct, and 
modes of  treatment which are liked or disliked’ (Miller, 
1976, p.92). There are different bases for calculating ‘deserts’ 
(Feinberg, 1973, p.102; Miller, 1976, p.89). They include 
merit (to each according to his/her merit) and contribution 
(to each according to his/her contribution). ‘Merit’ focuses 
on what attributes – typically virtues such as courage or 
technical skill and ability – a person possesses (Feinberg, 
1973 p.192; Vlastos, 1984, p.51). ‘Contribution’ focuses on 
what a person has done in the past to produce a particular 
state of  affairs. 
Need and justice
There is broad acceptance of  a linkage to the avoidance of  
harm (Benn and Peters, 1959, p.142; Miller, 1976, pp.129-31; 
O’Neill, 1996, p.115). Beyond this, the task of  identifying 
basic needs is controversial. Some see needs as including 
both natural and socially determined needs (see Benn and 
Peters, 1959; Townsend, 1983). Others argue that needs 
remain constant even if  increases in the standard of  living 
over time produce more commodities (e.g. televisions) which 
social pressure may present as ‘needs’ (see Miller, 1976; 
Braybrooke, 1987).
Part 2: The role of principles of 
distributive justice in the 
development of current climate 
change architecture
The negotiated hierarchy of differentiation under the UNFCCC 
Both the preamble to the UNFCCC and article 3 make clear 
the drafters’ concern in establishing a framework that is just 
and fair in both the international and the inter-generational 
spheres. In other words, at its heart the UNFCCC is a 
mechanism for rendering distributive justice both across 
Competing notions of what is equitable or just 
will depend on perception of – usually short-
term – national self-interest 
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borders and across time. That said, a degree of  moral 
ambiguity as to what is ‘just’ is present (Muller, 2001, p.286). 
Competing notions of  what is equitable or just will depend 
on perception of  – usually short-term – national self-interest 
(Baer and Athanasiou, 2007, p.12). State perceptions of  these 
interests will diverge greatly (Bodansky, 1993, p.477). 
The UNFCCC responds to and moderates this moral 
ambiguity. At its heart lies the notion that states, while 
nominally equal on the international plane, possess morally 
relevant differences with respect to their responsibility for 
addressing climate change. The UNFCCC thus embraces 
the Aristotelian formal principle of  justice and sanctions an 
unequal distribution of  climate change mitigation burden. 
Embedded within it are a set of  principles of  distributive 
justice which determine the pattern of  distribution of  
mitigation burden between states. 
The ordering of  these principles represents a negotiated 
hierarchy of  differentiation:
• Negotiated – there is no inherent hierarchical order of  the 
material principles of  justice (Ringus et al., 2002, p.17). 
The hierarchy that emerged resulted from a process of  
negotiation and compromise.
 • Hierarchy – the selected material principles of  justice 
are ranked according to the weight they are to have in 
determining the level of  any particular state’s mitigation 
burden relative to the burdens assumed by other states. 
• Differentiation – the effect of  the negotiated hierarchy is 
that states are to be treated differently. 
This is not to say that this hierarchy requires that the 
burden borne by states as a result of  the highest ranked 
principle be exhausted before burdens are imposed as a 
result of  lower order principles. Rather, each principle 
acts simultaneously, resulting in a balance of  commitments 
(Rajamani, 2001, p.125). 
When measured by the relative level of  burden assumed by 
states under the UNFCCC, a three-tiered structure emerges 
in which separate, discrete, categories of  differentiation are 
made. These will be referred to as first-, second- and third-
order differentiations. Driving these differentiations are 
separate principles of  distributive justice. In particular: 
• the first-order differentiation is desert-based linked to 
contribution; 
• the second-order differentiation is also desert-based but 
linked to ability;
• the third-order differentiation is need-based.
The first-order differentiation
For present purposes, the critical point is that achievement of  
the UNFCCC’s stabilisation objective requires limiting future 
total global emissions – ideally at a level close to current levels6 
– if  dangerous adverse climatic events are to be avoided. 
Under the UNFCCC, Annex 1 parties are required to take 
the lead and bear a greater burden by receiving a lesser share 
of  the future total global GHG emissions allowable in order 
to achieve the stabilisation objective. In other words, Annex 
1 parties ‘deserve’ a lesser share in the future and must 
therefore take steps to reduce the impact of  climate change 
through mitigation action. Non-Annex 1 parties, by contrast, 
deserve a greater share of  future emissions but such greater 
licence to emit must be exercised in an environmentally 
sustainable manner.
While developed countries resisted any suggestion 
they were to bear the main responsibility 
(Bodansky, 1993, p.498), the preamble to the 
UNFCCC (recital 3) nevertheless records the 
historical contribution of  developed states to 
current emissions levels as the context of  their 
obligation under article 3 ‘to take the lead’ 
in combating climate change. This points to 
the first-order differentiation being based on 
contribution to current levels of  anthropogenic 
GHG emissions.7 Furthermore, while both the 
preamble (recital 6) and article 3(1) also refer 
to the ‘respective capabilities of  the parties’, capability is a 
characteristic which all parties possess in some measure. Yet 
article 3(1) requires only some to take the lead in combating 
climate change. This also suggests that it is the characteristic 
of  historic contribution, unique to Annex 1 developed 
countries, rather than current ability, which is common to 
all parties in some form or another, which is given greater 
weight and which drives the first-order differentiation. 
Rather, ability as a distinct sub-species of  the desert-based 
principle of  distributive justice forms the basis of  a second-
order differentiation. 
The second-order differentiation
At this level of  differentiation, the UNFCCC postulates 
that the ‘just’ distribution of  mitigation burden depends 
on the state’s ability to assist with global efforts to reach 
the stabilisation objective. It reinforces the first-order 
differentiation by prioritising the abilities of  developed 
states – typically with greater technical and financial ability 
– over those of  developing states. However, an additional 
ability-based differentiation is also now introduced, this 
time between Annex 1 parties. While the UNFCCC expressly 
allows for flexibility for some Annex 1 parties identified as 
economies in transition so as to ‘enhance the ability of  these 
States to address climate change’ (see article 4(6)), article 
3(1) does not identify what the particular ability-related 
characteristics might be. Much of  the focus of  the post-
UNFCCC development process can be seen as an attempt to 
identify and agree on just what the relevant and appropriate 
individual circumstances should be. 
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When measured by the relative level of burden 
assumed by states under the UNFCCC, a three-
tiered structure emerges in which separate, 
discrete, categories of differentiation are made.
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Article 4(2)(a) sets the broad parameters of  second-order 
differentiation. These include a state’s:
• starting point and approach;
• economic structure; 
• resource base;
• available technology; and
• other individual circumstances. 
While reference is also made in article 4(2)(a) to various 
needs, such as the ‘need to maintain strong and sustainable 
economic growth’ and the ‘need for equitable and appropriate 
contributions’, need in this context is being used as a broad 
policy parameter applicable to all Annex 1 parties and not as 
a basis for distributing different quantities of  burden among 
them. 
The third-order differentiation
The preamble and article 3(1) reflect the truism that all states 
will possess some ability to contribute to global efforts to 
reach the stabilisation objective. However, such capability will 
vary. Countries with large populations but low development 
levels have the potential ability to contribute by adopting 
policies and measures that restrict certain aspects of  their 
development (e.g. transport). Often, these same countries 
have not contributed to the problem and so it seems unjust to 
impose such a burden on them. 
Concern that ability-based distribution may, even after 
historical contribution is taken into account, nevertheless 
result in an unjust distribution of  burden is reflected clearly 
in article 3(2) of  the UNFCCC. This provides that, in 
determining the level of  CBDR under article 3(1):
 the specific needs and special circumstances 
of  developing country Parties, especially 
those that are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of  climate 
change, and of  those Parties, especially 
developing country Parties, that would 
have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal 
burden under the Convention, should 
be given full consideration. (emphasis 
added)
Furthermore, article 4(7) states that:
 [t]he extent to which developing country parties will 
effectively implement their commitments under the 
Convention … will take fully into account that economic 
and social development are the first and overriding priorities 
of  developing country Parties. [emphasis added]
Although not expressed as needs, these ‘priorities’ clearly 
take the form of  needs. Any burden that would otherwise 
‘justly’ attach to a non-Annex 1 party as a result of  the 
second-order, ability-based distribution criterion is effectively 
subordinated to a need-based distribution. When viewed 
from the level of  burden assumed, this clearly represents the 
UNFCCC’s third-order differentiation. 
Obligation gap 
The term ‘obligation gap’ describes the domestic policy 
effect of  the negotiated hierarchy of  differentiation under 
the UNFCCC.
• Obligation – at the end of  the day, the UNFCCC is like 
any other treaty. It is a part of  public international law, 
which imposes binding obligations on states to perform 
what they have agreed to do in good faith (see Brownlie, 
2003, pp.591-2). 
• Gap – the obligations assumed by states differ in kind and 
exert differing degrees of  force on the particular state’s 
future domestic policy arena in terms of  the limitation 
and reduction of  GHG emissions. 
Under the UNFCCC, Annex 1 parties accepted 
additional commitments to the general commitments that 
all parties made (articles 4(2), 4(1)). In particular, Annex 
1 parties committed themselves to taking positive steps 
by adopting national policies and taking corresponding 
measures by limiting anthropogenic GHG emissions and 
protecting and enhancing GHG sinks and reservoirs (article 
4(1)). While a ‘certain degree of  flexibility’ was allowed for 
those Annex 1 parties with an ‘economy in transition’ (article 
4(6)), this flexibility related only to the implementation of  their 
commitments, not the nature of  their commitment to limit 
GHG emissions. For these states, there is an obligation to 
implement appropriate policy to achieve this outcome and 
show they are taking the lead in modifying longer-term 
emissions trends. The force exerted by the UNFCCC on 
their future domestic policy is strong.
In contrast, non-Annex 1 parties undertook commitments 
of  a lesser nature. These included:
• the development of  emissions inventories (article 4(1)(a)); 
• the formulation and implementation of  national and 
regional mitigation programmes (article 4(1)(b));
• the promotion of  sustainable management (article 4(1)
(d)); and 
• taking climate change into account when formulating 
wider policy (article 4(1)(f)). 
These obligations are generally much weaker and 
do not contain the same degree of  specificity as to policy 
outcomes. While national plans must be formulated and 
implemented which contain measures that ‘address’ 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removal by sinks 
(article 1(b)), this commitment does not specifically require 
there to be any limitation in GHG emissions so as to achieve 
the UNFCCC’s overall stabilisation objective. Provided the 
As a framework document, the UNFCCC sets 
out the principles that guide the parties in 
further negotiations undertaken at subsequent 
conferences of parties.
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domestic policy addresses climate change mitigation in good 
faith (for example, by prioritising renewable energy sources), 
this commitment validates domestic policies by non-Annex I 
parties under which GHG emissions may grow.
Justice and the further development of the UNFCCC 
architecture
As a framework document, the UNFCCC sets out the 
principles that guide the parties in further negotiations 
undertaken at subsequent conferences of  parties (COP). The 
following two were particularly important in shaping the 
current architecture. 
COP 1: The Berlin Mandate
The Berlin Mandate maintains the basic differentiations of  
the UNFCCC and, in particular, the first-order differentiation 
between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 parties. It is notable for 
the emphasis placed on the need-based principles of  justice 
which underpin the UNFCCC’s third-order differentiation 
as a means for reinforcing the UNFCCC’s first-order 
differentiation. Need-based justifications such as ‘the specific 
needs and concerns of  developing country parties and least 
developing country parties’ (article 1(b)) and the ‘legitimate 
needs’ of  developing countries in terms of  achieving sustained 
economic growth and eradicating poverty (article 1(c)) 
dominate the principles designed to guide the development 
of  the global climate change mitigation regime. 
The Berlin Mandate directed a process to result in 
time-bound, quantified reduction and limitation objectives 
(QERLOs) for Annex 1 parties (article 2(a)) while, at the same 
time, eschewing the introduction of  any new commitments 
by non-Annex 1 parties (article 2(b)). The principal effect 
of  this extra emphasis on developing-state oriented, need-
based distributive principles of  justice has been to widen the 
‘obligation gap’ created by the first-order differentiation. 
In so doing, the clear intention was to ensure that climate 
change mitigation burdens assumed by developing countries 
should not prevent their adoption of  policies designed to 
close the income gap with developed countries. At this level, 
the UNFCCC architecture expressly endorses equalitarian 
principles of  distributive justice, ‘designed to bring those 
with greater initial burden or deficit up to the same level as 
their fellows’ (Feinberg, 1973, p.111). This contrasts with 
the non-equalitarian principles of  desert (contribution) and 
desert (ability) which underpin the first- and second-order 
differentiations 
Ability-based principles of  distributive justice are also 
present. The Berlin Mandate refers to the CBDR principle 
under UNFCCC article 3(1) (articles 1(a), 1(e)). A critical 
component of  the work undertaken subsequently by the ad 
hoc group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) was precisely 
to develop a bundle of  possible relevant characteristics for 
differentiating among Annex 1 states for possible inclusion in the 
new legal instrument.8 The flexibility proposed to be granted 
to parties with economies in transition in accordance with 
UNFCCC article 4(6), together with the establishment of  
Joint Implementation and Clean Development mechanisms, 
represent instruments by which Annex 1 parties could 
discharge their obligations under UNFCCC 
according to their ability. 
COP 3: The Kyoto Protocol
The AGBM eventually produced a text for 
negotiation by parties at COP 3 in 1997 
(UNFCCC/AGBM/1997/3/Add.1, 22 April 
1997). The work of  the AGBM culminated 
in the adoption at COP3 of  a protocol to the 
UNFCCC – the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto 
Protocol quantifies the commitments made 
under UNFCCC articles 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) by 
setting a specified schedule of  reductions of  GHG emissions 
for Annex 1 parties. This has collective and individualised 
components. The individualised burdens are derived from 
a subjective assessment of  a state’s own capabilities, having 
regard to their particular circumstances.
Whereas both the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate 
relate to the nature of  the mitigation burden assumed by a 
state, the Kyoto Protocol is significant because it represents 
the mechanism for determining the extent of  the burden 
that any state is to bear as a result of  the application of  
the negotiated hierarchy of  differentiation to its particular 
national circumstances. 
Part 3: Justice and the structure of 
post-2012 policy architecture
The negotiated hierarchy of  differentiation and the obligation 
gap – a matrix for analysis
I suggest that conceptualising climate change mitigation 
architectures as constituting a negotiated hierarchy of  
differentiation and resulting in an obligation gap provides 
a useful matrix for shaping the complex issues that arise in 
designing any post-2012 policy architecture. 
The sort of  questions this analytical matrix opens up 
include:
• Is the current desert (contribution) based first-order 
differentiation, as reflected by Annex I status, simply too 
blunt an instrument when patterns of  projected future 
global emissions (particularly the future projections of  
major developing country emitters) are considered?9 
• Should the material principles of  justice upon which the 
current differentiations are based be re-ordered or re-
calibrated? To what extent should ‘need’ be prioritised 
It is important to recognise that there is no 
inherent hierarchy among the competing 
principles of distributive justice that preordains 
any hierarchy of differentiation between states
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over ‘ability’ across all non-Annex 1 parties, and for how 
long, particularly for those developing states such as China 
with large populations and rising per capita emissions? 
Should some forms of  ability (perhaps sector based) be 
prioritised over historical contribution? If  so, which?
• Should principles of  distributive justice not currently 
informing the shape of  the global architecture (e.g. equality, 
effort to date, etc.) be introduced? One recent study 
suggests that, although efforts vary, of  the G8 countries, 
none has yet implemented measures commensurate with 
a goal of  avoiding an increase in the global mean surface 
temperature of  more than a 2°C (Hoehne, Graus and 
Ellermann, 2007, p.34). 
• Should some ‘needs’, such as the need to ensure adequate 
food, shelter and health, be expressly recognised and 
given greater emphasis? If  so, in what 
way? How are ‘needs’ to be measured – 
by reference to some agreed level of  the 
particular social good in question or by 
proxy measurements such as GDP?10
• Is the current obligation gap too wide? 
Patterns of  global emissions mean 
that on a business-as-usual scenario, 
while short- and medium-term levels 
of  GHG emissions can be expected 
to be attributable to emissions from 
the ‘industrialised West’, this will not 
necessarily be the case in 2050. If  so, to what extent 
should a major emitter developing country’s domestic 
policy choices be subject to less constraint than states of  
the industrialised West?11 
It is important to recognise that there is no inherent 
hierarchy among the competing principles of  distributive 
justice that preordains any hierarchy of  differentiation 
between states; nor does any particular type of  mitigation 
commitment automatically flow from the application 
of  any particular principle of  distributive justice. While 
the differentiation informs the pattern of  distribution of  
the mitigation burden between states (broadly, do states 
assume an equal amount of  burden or, if  not, which states 
assume more and which less?), the nature of  the mitigation 
commitment that results from the pattern of  distribution is 
an entirely free-standing matter. Ethical considerations apply 
to both issues.
While it may be that there is no single, objective answer 
to the question, what constitutes a ‘just’ distribution of  
climate change mitigation burden post-2012, principles 
of  distributive justice can usefully inform the ongoing 
negotiations as to the post-2012 burden sharing agreement. 
Applying considerations of  distributive justice to the twin 
dimension suggested here will, I believe, allow for a more 
nuanced mitigation architecture to emerge – one that has 
greater chance of  being more widely accepted as ‘just’, and 
thus being more effective in meeting the UNFCCC’s climate 
stabilisation objective. 
Analysis of some suggested models for the post-2012  
policy architecture 
There are a plethora of  suggested proposals for burden 
sharing in the post-2012 environment.12 Commentaries 
on them are equally prevalent (see, for example, Baer and 
Athanasiou, 2007; Bodansky et al., 2004; Boeters et al., 2007; 
and Hoehne et al., 2007). It is simply not possible to review 
them all here. Accordingly, I will focus on three models:
• contraction and convergence; 
• multi-stage approaches; and
• sectoral approaches. 
A brief  discussion of  the essential features of  each type 
will be given, in order to shed some insight on how competing 
principles of  justice are utilised. In all cases, unless otherwise 
stated, these descriptions are taken from the summaries set 
out in Hoehne et al. (2007, pp.13-20). 
Contraction and convergence (C&C) and common but 
differentiated convergence (CDC)
C&C and CDC models are driven by the idea that states 
are ultimately entitled to an equal per capita allocation of  
GHG emissions. This emphasis on equality between states 
around a shared characteristic (i.e. population) is their basic 
organising principle of  justice. Mitigation burdens are not 
distributed on desert-based principles because the essence of  
these models is that all states ultimately are due the same per 
capita share of  future emission allowances. As such, these 
models represent something of  a paradigm shift from how 
concern with distributive justice is dealt with under current 
arrangements, which emphasise fundamental moral differences 
between states. Moreover, no obligation gap arises under 
the C&C and CDC models; each state has an immediately 
binding emission target designed to equalise per capita 
emissions over time. 
Plainly, however, equal per capita emissions cannot be 
achieved by the stroke of  the pen and both C&C and CDC 
envision a relatively lengthy period over which equalisation/
convergence will take place. The amount of  temporal latitude 
is determined by the maximum level of  GHG concentrations 
judged acceptable and the convergence time frame. Although 
negotiations over the convergence date may well involve 
intense debates as to how long developing states require to 
converge, the principle of  need plays a lesser, more transient 
role. It does not exempt those states with development needs 
from assuming binding commitments. It simply delineates the 
...equal per capita emissions cannot be 
achieved by the stroke of the pen and both C&C 
and CDC envision a relatively lengthy period over 
which equalisation/convergence will take place.
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length of  time these states can entertain a rise in per capita 
emissions. Once convergence is reached, the ‘need’ ceases 
to play any part in shaping the distribution of  mitigation 
burden. While the CDC model does give some emphasis 
to historical contribution in that it maintains the Annex 1/
non-Annex 1 distinction, as with need, this differentiation 
also has a weaker role than under present arrangements. It 
does not result in weaker commitments, but rather makes the 
assumption of  commitment contingent on the reaching of  
the agreed threshold.13
Multi-stage approaches14
As the name suggests, under such approaches, states 
participate in a global framework but at different stages. Each 
stage involves the assumption of  an increasingly stringent 
mitigation commitment. A comprehensive example of  this 
model is the Climate Protection Programme’s South–North 
Dialogue proposal (Climate Protection Programme, 2004). 
The SND proposal divides states into six separate categories 
based upon status under the UNFCCC and development 
status, with each category falling into a particular stage. 
15 At one end of  the spectrum are Annex I parties, which 
have absolute reduction targets. At the other end are least 
developed countries, which have no quantitative reductions 
commitments. The SND proposal utilises three main 
concepts: 
• Responsibility – contribution to temperature increase. The 
larger the degree of  responsibility, the more onerous 
the mitigation commitment assumed by the state in 
question.
• Capability – the ‘financial and socio-economic wherewithal’ 
to help overcome the climate problem. Those with greater 
capability fund sustainable development in states with low 
capability. 
• Potential – the opportunities for mitigation within the 
economy through GHG reductions or pre-empting growth 
through cleaner development. The greater the potential, 
the higher the domestic reduction commitments.
Driving this proposal is a complex, four-tiered system 
of  differentiation. In terms of  the underlying principles of  
justice, noting the moral and practical necessity of  deep cuts 
in emissions by Annex 1 states, the first-order differentiation 
is accordingly desert (or contribution) based, as under the 
UNFCCC. Beyond this, the picture becomes blurred. ‘Need’ 
is employed to moderate both capability and potential. 
For example, the model recognises that a certain level of  
emissions may well be necessary to guarantee ‘a decent life 
for poor people’. However, under the SND proposal, need-
based principles of  justice do not assume any independent 
role but instead are subsumed within broader considerations 
of  capability and potential. Rather than trump outright 
any pattern of  distribution of  mitigation burden that 
might otherwise arise from capability or potential-based 
considerations, ‘need’ acts to moderate their effect as part of  
the complex interplay between the three nominated criteria. 
In this sense, the South–North model stands in 
stark contrast to the current architecture. 
The effect of  this moderating role is 
reflected in a more nuanced range of  
mitigation burdens. The model recognises that 
a state’s social and development ‘needs’ change 
and thus, by definition, both their mitigation 
potential and capability change over time. 
States are therefore able to move between the 
categories as they meet or fall below thresholds 
in all three criteria. Insofar as ‘need’ impacts 
upon the mitigation capability or potential of  any non-
Annex 1 party, this is capable of  giving rise to a graduated 
level of  commitment. The SND proposal therefore seeks to 
close the obligation gap that need-based principles of  justice 
produce under the current framework, at least in relation to 
some non-Annex 1 parties. 
What seems clear is that, in contemplating a more nuanced 
approach to issues of  responsibility in which some current 
non-Annex 1 parties assume absolute limitation or reduction 
targets, the model extends the application of  desert-based 
distribution beyond that of  the current framework. 
Sectoral approaches
Sectoral approaches fall into three broad categories: 
transnational, intergovernmental and sectoral crediting 
(Boston and Kengmana, 2007, pp.161-2). Each has the 
common goal of  addressing competitiveness-at-risk concerns 
by imposing common rules on identified sectors, and 
products within sectors, across all countries (Hoehne et al., 
2007, p.18). 
In terms of  the organising principles of  justice, a number 
of  points arise in relation to sectoral approaches. First, in 
general terms, sectoral approaches differ from other models 
of  possible post-2012 climate change mitigation architectures 
in that the unit of  analysis is not the state, as such, but a 
particular sector of  economic activity within the state. 
Distribution of  mitigation burden is, therefore, contingent 
on the presence of  the economic activity within the territory 
of  the state and this represents the first-order differentiation 
under such models. 
Second, in contrast to the present architecture, the first-
order differentiation under any sectorally-oriented post-2012 
architecture utilises ability-based principles of  distributive 
justice. Bodansky (2007, pp.9-11) identifies three categories 
of  factors for evaluating which sectors represent the best 
... the requirements of justice – and especially 
the immorality of a business-as-usual scenario 
– remind us why we must take the scientific 
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candidates for inclusion under this approach, namely 
environmental, economic and negotiation/participation 
factors. The common characteristic of  these factors is that 
they all relate to the capability of  any particular sector to 
contribute to global efforts to achieve the UNFCCC’s 
stabilisation objective. 
Third, whereas transnational and intergovernmental 
approaches do not differentiate on the basis of  historical 
responsibility (contribution), the sectoral crediting 
mechanism is very much intended to reflect this. For sectoral 
crediting approaches, which retain the Annex 1/non-Annex 
1 distinction, this represents a second-order differentiation. 
However, any distribution of  mitigation burden on the basis 
of  desert (contribution) occurs only after a prior differential 
distribution of  burden on the basis of  desert (ability). This 
represents an inversion of  the hierarchy under the current 
architecture.
Fourth, sectoral agreements are very flexible devices, 
able to include almost any kind of  mitigation commitment 
(Bodansky, 2007, p.3). As such, they represent an ideal 
vehicle for introducing more graduated normative force 
into the mitigation burden assumed by states than presently 
exists. Moreover, each state would possess differing amounts 
of  the relevant distributive characteristic, i.e. the presence 
of  economic activity in the particular sector. It is entirely 
possible for there to be differing types of  commitment 
not just between states but between sectors within states. 
This demonstrates the potential responsiveness of  sectoral 
approaches to the particularities of  a state’s unique emission 
profile. As such, these approaches arguably represent a more 
viable mechanism for calculating the ‘dues’ of  any particular 
state in terms of  the climate change mitigation burdens it 
assumes. 
Finally, depending on the precise structure of  any sectoral 
agreement, need-based principles of  justice may not have 
the same prominence as under the current architecture. 
Under intergovernmental and transnational agreements, 
developmental ‘need’ does not operate so as to exclude 
a developing country from the regime, nor result in any 
difference in the type of  mitigation commitment assumed. 
Insofar as sectoral crediting may result in some difference 
in the distribution of  burden, this results not from need, but 
from merit-based concerns linked to historical responsibility. 
This is not to say that need-based principles of  justice 
will necessarily be wholly absent from the design of  any 
sectorally-based post-2012 architecture. Considerations of  
‘need’ may well play some role in determining the degree 
to which voluntary pledges are assumed in relation to some 
sectors of  economic activity. 
Conclusion
While much attention is placed on the science of  climate 
change in the design of  a post-2012 policy architecture, and 
rightly so, it is equally important not to lose sight of  justice. 
After all, the requirements of  justice – and especially the 
immorality of  a business-as-usual scenario – remind us why 
we must take the scientific evidence seriously.
This article has argued that a concern for justice is 
at the heart of  the UNFCCC, and must continue to play 
a significant role in determining how mitigation burdens 
are distributed post-2012. Whether any proposed policy 
architecture is accepted by states to be both internationally 
and inter-generationally ‘just’ will be critical in ensuring its 
wide acceptance, and thus the regime’s overall effectiveness 
in terms of  reducing GHG emissions. 
But, as the proceeding analysis has highlighted, there 
are a number of  different material principles of  distributive 
justice. There are also competing models for achieving 
global emission reductions, each of  which gives somewhat 
different weightings to these principles. The fact that there 
are a number of  competing principles and models points 
to the need for compromise and accommodation, in terms 
either of  the degree of  differentiation between states or of  
the nature of  the obligations assumed on the basis of  that 
differentiation. Plainly, securing an acceptable compromise 
over the next year or so will be difficult. The negotiations 
leading up to Copenhagen (and beyond) will be tough. 
Realpolitik will never be far from the surface. Ott (2007, 
p.17) has described the process of  international negotiations 
over current and future climate change regimes as being akin 
to ‘trench warfare’ conducted in zero-sum terms. It is only by 
keeping the ethical underpinnings of  the UNFCCC firmly 
in mind that we can ensure that the narrowly defined self-
interest which leads to this trench warfare is overcome to the 
mutual benefit of  us all.
1 This article is a revised and abridged version of a paper submitted as a course requirement 
for completion of a Masters of Public Policy. The revised version was provided as a 
background paper for the Post-2012 Burden Sharing symposium, 29 July 2008, Wellington, 
jointly hosted by the European Union Centres Network and the Institute of Policy Studies. 
I would like to thank Jonathan Boston and Lucas Kengmana for their comments on earlier 
drafts. 
2 While some overlap between mitigation and climate change adaptation exists, adaptation 
raises a discrete set of issues. For discussion of this topic see, generally, Boston and 
Kengmana (2007, p.168), Climate Protection Programme (2004, p.210) and Paavola and 
Adger (2002).
3 This political dimension has also been termed a ‘negotiation dimension by Ringus et al. 
(2002, p.3), who argue that justice operates in three different ways. First, it can serve as 
a source of ‘motivational strength’ for actors who believe they are being ‘unfairly’ treated. 
Second, it can operate as a framework of soft constraint in the pursuit of self-interest. The 
point here seems to be that justice may set the outer bounds of negotiation positions taken 
in response to the Westphalian imperative to maximise a national self-interest. Third, it may 
operate as a decision premise, ‘where self interest provides no clear guidance’. 
4 Some, notably Rawls (1993), argue that principles of distributive justice have no place in 
the international arena where no institution fulfils the same role as the national political 
authority (Banuri et al., 1996, p.85). While others (Caney, 2005a, 2005b; Pogge, 2002) 
mount a fuller defence of the case for extending familiar principles of justice from the 
domestic to the international arena, the relevance of these non-international principles 
of justice is simply assumed in the available literature (see, for example, Grasso, 2007, 
p.230; Muller, 2001, p.273; Ringus et al., 2002, p.4). This can, perhaps, be explained 
by the UNFCCC’s reference to ‘equity’ as a guiding principle and by Shue’s (1999, p.531) 
observation that ‘[t]he concept of fairness is neither Eastern not Western, Northern or 
Southern, but universal. People everywhere understand what it means to ask whether 
an arrangement is fair or biased towards some parties over other parties’ (Shue, 1999, 
p.531).
5 While there is some debate as to whether there is only one single criterion of justice or, if 
many, how many, it is not proposed to enter into his debate here. Arguments in favour of 
a single criterion run the risk of circularity as the criterion chosen must have been chosen 
because it was considered the most just. 
6 Currently CO2 concentration is at approximately 385ppmv (CO2 only). One study has 
concluded that to have 50/50 chance of stabilising at 2°C above pre-industrial levels would 
require atmospheric concentrations of 400ppmv (CO2 only), and that current levels mean it 
is not ‘likely to be met’ in the sense of there being a 2% –55% chance of stabilising above 
this level – see Hoehne et al. (2007, p.10 and sources). 
7 In this regard, the UNFCCC removes some of the concerns expressed by Feinberg (1973, 
pp.114-6) as to how the ‘contribution’ can be accurately measured in other policy contexts, 
such as the distribution of national wealth and income.
8 See reports of the AGBM UNFCCC/AGBM/1996/7 which, at paragraph 10, notes different 
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approaches and records (paragraph 23) that three broad types of indicator, namely national 
emissions, national circumstances and costs of action, were advocated. Within each type, a 
cluster of further potential indicators are specified – see paragraphs 31 and 12.
9 For example, one modelling exercise has predicted that, depending on which GHG sources 
are counted, taking historical and projected emissions into account there will be parity of 
contribution to atmospheric GHG levels as early 2030 (Baumert et al., 2004, p.16). The 
issue is further underscored by another study which suggests that China’s emission will 
grow by 119%, India’s by 131% and Brazil’s by 70%. In comparison the EU’s will grow by 
only 8% (Claussen, 2007). 
10 The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework (Baer, Athanasiou and Kartha, 2007, 
pp.27-8) is a model which seeks to accommodate concern with alleviating poverty and 
underdevelopment within a global climate change mitigation burden. Its authors argue for a 
‘development threshold, below which individuals are entitled to prioritise their development 
needs over any burden they otherwise have to bear in respect of climate change mitigation 
or adaptation’. The authors argue for an income-based measurement and that an individual 
income level of $16 per day constitutes the appropriate threshold level at which climate 
change mitigation and adaptation burdens will be assumed. 
11 The answer may well depend on the time period regulated by way of further commitment 
periods. It may be that if second and subsequent commitment periods are relatively short, 
similar in length to that set by the Kyoto Protocol, the obligation gap between the mitigation 
commitments assumed by China and other major emitter developing states may ‘justly’ be 
considered less. If subsequent commitment periods stretch to substantially longer-term 
horizons, say 2050-2080, current non-Annex 1 parties whose share of global emissions are 
projected to rise by significant amounts might ‘justly’ take on a greater level of mitigation 
commitment.
12 Bodansky et al. (2004) identity 40 separate ideas emanating from the literature, reports 
and symposia on this topic. Ott (2007, p.29) puts the figure is as high as 50.
13 If equalising per capita emissions is to be the basic principle then this suggests a 
distribution pattern that would require most cuts in Australia and the United States, the 
latter not having ratified the Kyoto Protocol. South Korea has the same per capita emissions 
as the United Kingdom and more than the EU average. Baumert et al., (2004, pp.11-12) 
note that if gases other than CO2 are used the gap in per capita emissions between Annex 
1 and non-Annex 1 countries closes. Per capita emissions for China, India and Brazil rise by 
38%, 67% and 160% respectively, while those for the EU, United States and Japan rise by 
22%, 20% and 8% respectively. The position changes even more dramatically if emissions 
from land use change are added, as this represents a third of developing country emissions 
levels while developed states may be net absorbers in this context. If all gases, including 
CO2 from land use, are included Brazil and Indonesia have higher per capita emissions than 
the EU.
14 In Baer and Athansious’s (2007) analysis, this is called the South–North Dialogue’s ‘Equity 
in the Greenhouse’ proposal. 
15 The six categories are: UNFCCC Annex I parties, except Annex II states (i.e. economies in 
transition (EIT)); Annex II states; newly industrialised countries (NICs); rapidly industrialising 
developing countries (RIDCs); other developing countries; and least developed countries.
References
Baer, P. and T. Athanasiou (2007) Frameworks and 
Proposals: a brief adequacy and equity based 
evaluation of some prominent climate change 
frameworks and proposals, global issues 
paper 30, Berlin: Heinrich Boll Foundation
Baer, P., T. Athanasiou and S. Kartha (2007) 
The Right to Development in a Climate 
Constrained World: the greenhouse 
development rights framework, Berlin: 
Heinrich Boll Foundation
Banuri, T., M. Goran-Maler, M. Grubb, H.K. 
Jacobson and F. Yamin (1996) Equity and 
Social Considerations, Cambridge: IPCC
Baumert.K., J. Pershing, T. Herzog and M. 
Markoff (2004) Climate Data: insight and 
observations, Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change
Braybrooke, D. (1987) Meeting Needs, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press
Benn, S. and R. Peters (1959) Social Principles 
and the Democratic State, London: Allen and 
Unwin
Bodansky, D. (1993) ‘The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
a commentary’, Yale Journal of International 
Law, 18
Bodansky, D. (2007) International Sectorial 
Agreements in a Post 2012 Climate 
Framework, working paper, Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change
Bodansky, D., S. Chou and C. Jorge-Tresolini 
(2004) International Climate Change Efforts 
Beyond 2012: a survey of approaches, 
working paper, Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change
Boeters, S., M.G.J. den Elzen, A.J.G. Manders, 
P.J.J. Veenendaal and G. Verweij (2007) Post 
2012 Climate Policy Scenarios, Netherlands 
Environmental Agency MNP report 
500114006/2007
Borione, D. and J. Ripert (1994) ‘Exercising 
common but differentiated responsibility’, 
in I. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard (eds.), 
Negotiating the Climate Convention, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Boston, J. and L. Kengmana (2007) ‘Post 2012: 
policy issues and options’, in J. Boston (ed.), 
Towards a New Global Climate Treaty: looking 
beyond 2012, Wellington: Institute of Policy 
Studies, Victoria University of Wellington
Brownlie, I. (2003) Principles of Public 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press
Caney, S. (2005a) ‘Cosmopolitan justice, 
responsibility and global climate change’, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 18
Caney, S. (2005b) Justice Beyond Borders: 
a global political theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press
Claussen, E. (2007) ‘Background briefing: 
international climate issues’, National Press 
Club, Washington D.C.: Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change
Climate Protection Programme (2004) South–
North Dialogue on Equity in the Greenhouse: 
a proposal for an adequate and equitable 
global climate agreement, Eschborn: German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development
Feinberg, J. (1973) Social Philososphy, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Freestone, D. and C. Streck (2005) Legal 
Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
Mechanisms: making Kyoto work, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Grasso, M. (2007) ‘A normative ethical framework 
in climate change’, Climatic Change, 81
Hoehne, N., W. Graus and C. Ellermann (2007) 
WWF Climate Scorecards: assessment of 
the climate performance of the G8 plus 5 
countries, World Wide Fund for Nature
Hoehne, N., D. Phylipseon and S. Moltman (2007) 
Factors Underpinning Future Action, United 
Kingdom Department for Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs report PESCDE061439 and 
PECSDE063060
IPCC (2007) ‘Summary for policymakers’, in M.L. 
Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van 
der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds), Climate 
Change 2007: impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 
II to the fourth assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Miller, D. (1976) Social Justice, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press
Muller, B. (2001) ‘Varieties of distributive justice 
in climate change,’ Climatic Change, 48
Najam, A. (2005) ‘Developing countries and global 
environmental governance: from contestation 
to participation in engagement’, International 
Environmental Agreements, 2005 (5), 
pp.303-21
Nitze, W. (1994) ‘A failure of presidential 
leadership’, in I. Mintzer and J. Amber 
Leonard (eds.), Negotiating the Climate 
Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
O’Neill, O. (1996) Towards Justice and Virtue, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ott, H.E. (2007) Climate Change Policy Post-2012 
– a road map: the global governance of 
climate change, discussion paper, Tällberg 
Foundation
Paavola, J. and W.N. Adger (2002) Justice and 
Adaptation to Climate, working paper 23, 
Tyndall Centre For Climate Change
Paavola, J. and W.N. Adger (2006) ‘Fair adaptation 
to climate change’, Ecological Economics, 56
Pew Center (2005) International Climate Efforts 
Beyond 2012: report of the climate dialogue 
at Pocantico, Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change
Pogge, T. (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights, 
Cambridge: Polity Press
Rajamani, L. (2000) ‘The principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility and the balance 
of commitments under the climate regime’, 
Review of Community and International 
Environmental Law, 9 (2)
Rajamani, L. (2006) Differential Treatment in 
International Environmental Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Rawls, J. (1993), ‘The law of peoples’, Critical 
Inquiry, 20 (1), autumn, pp.36-68
Ringus, L., A. Torvanger and A. Underdal (2002) 
‘Burden sharing and fairness principles in 
international climate policy’, International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, 2 
Sebenuis, J.K. (1994) ‘Towards a winning climate 
coalition,’ in I. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard 
(eds), Negotiating the Climate Convention, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Shue, H. (1999) ‘Global environment and 
international inequality,’ International Affairs, 
75 (3)
Shukla, P. (1999) ‘Justice equity and efficiency 
in climate change: a developing country 
perspective’, in F. Toth (ed.), Fair Weather? 
Equity concerns in climate change, London: 
Earthscan
Vlastos, G. (1984) ‘Justice and equality,’ in J. 
Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Justice and Post-2012 Global Climate Change Mitigation Architecture
